Failures and lessons
Mixed result (manager collapsed; fund assets survived under new management; investor recoveries not public)
Abraaj Growth Markets Health Fund: when the manager fails, not the thesis
Mixed result (manager collapsed; fund assets survived under new management; investor recoveries not public). What was attempted, what happened, what is documented and what can be learned.
- Last reviewed
- Related chapter
- Chapter Five, section 3 (transparency and accountability guardrails); step 5 (test against the guardrails)
- Sectors
- Health
- Geography
- South Asia and Africa (India, Pakistan, Kenya, Nigeria)
- Vehicles
- Private equity fund with catalytic anchor (Gates Foundation programme-related investment)
What was attempted
The Abraaj Growth Markets Health Fund was a USD 1 billion private equity fund, launched in 2016 by the Dubai-based Abraaj Group, to invest in hospitals, clinics, and diagnostics across South Asia and Africa. The Gates Foundation seeded it with a USD 100 million programme-related investment and helped recruit the International Finance Corporation, the UK's CDC Group (now British International Investment), and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (now DFC). It was, at the time, the largest impact fund in healthcare and a flagship case for foundations taking catalytic positions alongside DFIs in commercial funds.
What happened
In early 2018 investors, led by the Gates Foundation and others, raised concerns that fund capital had been used for purposes outside the fund. Investors appointed forensic auditors. Abraaj disclosed in May 2018 that it had used money from one of its funds for general corporate purposes. In June 2018 Abraaj's holding company filed for liquidation in the Cayman Islands. AlixPartners was appointed interim manager of the health fund in July 2018 under a court-sanctioned protocol. In June 2019, management of the fund transferred to TPG Growth, which continued the portfolio (later under the Evercare name). Abraaj's founder and senior executives were subsequently charged with fraud in the United States; the founder lost an extradition appeal in 2023.
At the time of the crisis, the fund held interests in 26 hospitals, 18 clinics, and 40 diagnostics centres with around 10,000 employees serving around two million patients a year. The AlixPartners case study reports that the transition allowed this work to continue. Limited partner recoveries are not public.
What is documented and what is not
Documented: the fund's size and anchor investors; the investor-led investigation; Abraaj's disclosure; the liquidation; the interim management and transfer to TPG; the fraud charges. Not documented in the sources reviewed: how much limited partners recovered, whether the health outcomes of the portfolio hospitals were affected during the transition, and what due diligence the Gates Foundation and the DFIs conducted before committing.
What the failure was, and was not
The investment thesis (private capital for healthcare infrastructure in underserved markets) was not what failed; the portfolio continued under a new manager. What failed was governance: a manager that commingled fund capital with its own, and a set of sophisticated anchor investors who did not detect it until the fund was two years old. ImpactAlpha's analysis at the time asked whether the Gates Foundation would publish what its own review found about its due diligence, and warned that the collapse could chill private-equity participation in SDG investing.
Lesson for catalytic philanthropy
A catalytic anchor investment confers legitimacy. The Gates Foundation's USD 100 million was the signal that brought IFC, CDC, and OPIC in; the book's Chapter Three calls this the signal role. The lesson is that the signal carries an obligation. When a foundation's participation is what persuades others to commit, its due diligence is doing work for the whole stack, and a failure of that diligence is amplified in the same way its success would have been. The transparency guardrail in Chapter Five ("every actor in the stack should be able to see the terms every other actor is on") was, in this case, not satisfied by the manager, and the catalytic investors did not have the visibility to know it.
Sources
Educational material, not investment, legal or tax advice. Reported figures and review dates reflect the cited sources and editorial review; they are not live data.
